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DAMAGES
By EDGAR HUNTER WILSON*
During the period of this survey the appellate courts of Georgia have
reaffirmed the following general principles of the law of damages: Exemplary damages may not be recovered in actions on contracts.' A jury
finding as to the amount of damages will not be upset unless the amount
is so small or so large as to indicate "gross mistake or undue prejudice." 2
"General damages are such that the law presumes to flow from any wrongful act, which the law denominates a tort, and may be recovered without
proof of any amount."' The amount of general damages or injury to
the person and for pain and suffering are left to the enlightened conscience
of an impartial jury.' In an action for libel per se, general damages are
recoverable without a showing of special damages. and the measure is
the conscience of the jury.5 Actual malice and not implied in law malice
is such an aggravating circumstance as will allow additional damages to
deter the wrong-doer 6or compensate the wounded feelings of the injured
party in a tort action
Several cases dealt with the measure of damages in particular situations.
In City of 4tlanta.v. Kenny7 the problem was the measure of damages for
a building that collapsed as the result of excavations conducted by the
city. The plaintiff alleged that the market value before the collapse was
$20,40o and that the building was presently worthless. Damage was also
alleged by reason of the abandonment by the tenant and the resulting loss
of rent, diminution in rental value and the cost of removing debris. The
court ruled that special demurrers should have been sustained to all of these
allegations except those showing the actual diminution of market value,
that being the correct measure.
Studebaker Corp. v. Nail' was an action by the purchaser of an automobile against the manufacturer for breach of warranty. The automobile had
been repossessed some time prior to this action. The plaintiff contended
that his measure of damages was the portion of the purchase price paid
by him, but the court held that such was the measure only when the article
warranted was totally worthless which was not true of this automibile.
Where the defect has not been corrected and the property is not worthless, the proper measure is the difference between the market value at the
*Associate Professor of Law, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University;
LL.B., 1948, LL.M. 1948, Duke University School of Law; Member North Carolina
and Georgia Bar Associations.
1. Cain v. Tuten, 82 Ga. App. 102, 60 S.E.2d 485 (1950), applying GA. CODE § 20-1405
(1933).
"2. Russell v. Bass, 82 Ga. App. 659, 62 S.E.2d 456 (1950), applying GA. CODE § 1052015 (1933).
.3. Tyson v. Shoemaker, 83 Ga. App. 33, 57, 62 S.E.2d 586, 601 (1950), rev'd on other
grounds, 208 Ga.28, 65 S.E.2d 163 (1951).
4. 83 Ga. App. at 56, 62 S.E.2d at 600; Atlanta & W.P.R. Co. v. Gilbert, 82 Ga. App.
244, 60 S.E.2d 787 (1950).
5. Atlanta Journal Co. v. Doyal, 82 Ga. App. 321, 60 S.E.2d 802 (1950).
6. Ibid., applying Ga. Code § 105-2003 (1933).
7. 83 Ga. App. 823, 64 S.E.2d 912 (1951).
.8. 82 Ga. App. 779, 62 S.E.2d 198 (1950).
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time of delivery and the purchase price-and, although the court does not
so indicate, it would seem here, subject to an adjustment because only part
of the purchase price had been paid.
In Rose City Foods, Inc. v. Bank of Thomas County9 the bank held a
bill of sale to secure debt on certain trucks. This action was in trover for
the wrongful conversion of the property and the bank was asking for a
money verdict under the provisions of Code Section 107-1O5. The court
stated the measure of damages to be either the highest value of the
property between date of conversion and trial or the value at the time
of conversion with interest or hire but, in no event, could the recovery
exceed the amount of the debt which the property secured.
The opinion in Padgett '. HWilliams'" indicates that the usual instruction
on the question of measure of damages for injury to an automobile is "the
difference between the value of the property before and after the damage."
However, when the owner, as here, makes repairs he may recover the
reasonable value of the labor and materials used in repairing, the permanent impairment after repairs and hire while the automobile was out of
use, so long as the total amount does not exceed the value of the automobile before injury, plus interest.
In Herrman v. Conway" the plaintiff had subcontracted to do certain
lathing and plastering work for defendant, prime contractor. Plaintiff
did part of the work and was wrongfully prevented by defendant from
completing. Plaintiff's damages were measured by the difference between
the contract price and the cost of completing the work plus the amount
acutally expended by plaintiff for the part performed.
-Several cases made it clear that a very careful distinction must be
drawn between damages for the loss of "capacity to labor" and "earning
capacity." In /Jtlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Ouzts" the trial court had
given the following instruction in this connection: "Gentlemen, damages
are given as compensation for injuries done. Elements of damage where
there is phyical injury are pain and suffering, physical and mental, past and
future, continuing injury to health and other physical condition; loss of
capacity to make a living." Later he charged: "The guide for fixing damages, if any, for pain and suffering, or diminished capacity to labor, as
distinguished from earning capacity, is the enlightened consciences of impartial jurors. . . ." The Court of Appeals held that the first quoted instruction was not technically correct but no harm was done because the
second instruction made the law clear. The cases hold that loss of capacity
to labor is an element of pain and suffering and is measured only by the
conscience of the Jury, whereas damages for loss of earning capacity are
soecial and must be established by sufficient data on which a jury may
establish their finding."3 West v. Alloore1 ' was cited by the court as authority
for the proposition that diminution of earning capacity is an element of
damages for pain and suffering. The West case seems to justify that posi9.
10.
11.
12.

207 Ga. 477, 62 S.E.2d 145 (1950).
82 Ga. App. 509.61 S.E.2d 676 (1950).
83 Ga. App. 888, 65 S.E.2d 41 (1951).
82 Ga. Ann. 36. 60 S.E,2d 770 (1950) ; to the same effect, Tyson v. Shoemaker, 83
Ga. App. 33, 62 S.E.2d 586 (1950).
13. Railway Express Agencv. nc. v. Mathis, 83 Ga. App. 415, 63 S.E.2d 921 (1951).
14. 44 Ga. App. 214, 160 S.E. 811 (1931).
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tion on the basis that worry and suffering may follow from the fact that
the plaintiff knows his earning capacity is diminished. The opinion in that
case is not as clear as might be desired, but if the above is a fair interpretation of the decision, the rule would be supportable. The objection of this
writer is that nowhere in the opinion does it appear that the limitations
of this rule are made clear to the jury. It is believed that a jury listening
to an instruction like the one quoted above would think that they were
being directed to compensate in damages for the money plaintiff will lose
because of his reduced earning capacity" rather than simply awarding an
amount for the mental anguish he will have suffered because of the impaired capacity. The distinction is too subtle and ill-defined for an assurance that the average jury would comprehend the true intent of the
instructions.
In dtlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Ansley" the trial court instructed that
the jury might give additional damages because of aggravating circumstances in a tort action and in arriving at the amount they might consider
"injury to his earning capacity" among other things. It was held that additional damages for aggravation pursuant to Code Section 105-2002 did
not concern injury to earning capacity which must be proved by proper
evidence.
In a trover action" for the conversion of an automobile the jury returned a verdict which stated a certain principal amount and indicated that
interest at seven per cent was awarded in addition. The trial judge computed the interest and entered a judgment for the total amount. The defendant appealed on the general grounds and sought by brief to raise the
point that such a verdict was illegal (i.e., stating principal and interest
separately). The court agreed that the form of the verdict was wrong
and properly should have been for a total sum, although it was permissible
for the jury to consider interest from the time of conversion in arriving
at a total verdict. The defendant was not allowed to take advantage of
the defect because there had been no special assignment of error. The
court also pointed out that, even if a proper assignment or error had been
entered, a reversal would simply be conditional on writing off the interest.
In Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Southern Gas Co.'" the plaintiff was
suing for damage in shipment to certain heaters. It appeared from the
evidence that the heaters were damaged but were not totally worthless as
alleged. The jury returned a verdict for the total amount prayed for in
the petition. Defendant claimed this was error because the damaged
heaters clearly had some value. However, the judgment was sustained because there was evidence tending to show that the heaters in an undamaged
condition had a market value greater that that alleged in the complaint, and
therefore, the jury might have found that the heaters had some salvage
value and still award the total amount asked for by plaintiff.
The courts also held: a verdict of $ioo "nominal damages" sustainable
in an action for trespass to realty where the evidence concerning damage
15. Indeed, this writer cannot be certain that such is not exactly what the courts intend
to tell the jury.
16. 84 Ga. Apn. 89,.65 S.E.2d 463 (1951).
17. Smith v. Clayton, 83 Ga. App. 777.64 S.E.2d 691 (1951).
18. 83 Ga. App. 808, 65 S.E.2d 61 (1951).
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was conflicting;" a defendant counterclaiming for affirmative relief in
damages must allege damages with the same particularity necessary if he
were initiating the action ;21 a verdict of $ii,ooo for injuries sustained in
a grade crossing accident was not excessive; 21 a plaintiff waives his right
to general or nominal damages where the petition sets forth items of22
special damage which exactly equal the amount sought in the petition;
the evidence sustained a $5,ooo verdict for injuries to the person and
vehicle, and exclusion as evidence of amount of settlement with plaintiff's
insurer to show value of the truck was not harmful error ;23 a covenant not to
sue given to a joint tort-feasor in return for $4,000 was properly allowed in
24
evidence to mitigate damages in an action against the other tort-feasor;
in a personal injury action where the defendant (son) had paid medical
expenses of the plaintiff (mother) and taken a note from the plaintiff
in return, the medical expenses were properly allowed in evidence for
determining the amount of damages ;25 expenses of litigation are allowable
as damages under Code Section 20-1404 when the defendant has acted in
bad faith or caused the plaintiff unnecessary trouble and expense.26
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Galloway v. Anderson, 83 Ga. App. 405, 63 S.E.2d 712 (1951). In Pruitt v. Satterfield, 207 Ga. 25, 59 S.E.2d 907 (1950), the evidence was insufficient to show any
damages for the trespass.
Alpharetta Feed & Poultry Co. v. Cocke, 82 Ga. App. 718, 62 S.E.2d 642 (1950);
Smith v. Monroe, 82 Ga. App. 118, 60 S.E.2d 790 (1950).
Atlanta & W.P.R. Co. v. Gilbert. 82 Ga. App. 244, 60 S.E.2d 787 (1950).
Stewart v. Western Union Tel. Co., 83 Ga. App. 532, 64 S.E.2d 327 (1951).
Royal Crown Bottling Co. of Gainesville v. Stiles, 82 Ga. App. 254, 60 S.E.2d 815
(1950).
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Ouzts, 82 Ga. App. 36, 60 S.E.2d 770 (1950).
Wheeler v. Wheeler, 82 Ga. App. 831, 62 S.E.2d 579 (1950).
Atlanta Journal Co. v. Doyal, 82 Ga. App. 321, 60 S.E.2d 802 (1950).

